The judgment of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny – NSA) of 8 January 2026 (case no. II GSK 2789/25) is one of the most important recent rulings on administrative liability in the field of food quality compliance. Although the case concerned a specific batch of frozen raspberries imported from outside the EU (Ukraine), its implications are far broader and of clear systemic and practical relevance for the entire food sector.
The Court clearly drew the line between the broad legal definition of “placing on the market” and the obligation of the competent authority to demonstrate that this condition has been met in a given case. This distinction is fundamental to the lawful application of administrative sanctions.
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The proceedings concerned an administrative fine imposed by the Trade Quality Inspection of Agricultural and Food Products (Inspekcja Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych – IJHARS) for the alleged placing on the market of food products that did not meet trade quality requirements. During a border inspection, quality defects were identified in a batch of frozen raspberries imported from Ukraine.
The regional inspectorate issued a decision prohibiting the placing of the product on the market (a decision which the company did not appeal). Subsequently, in a separate procedure, the same authority imposed an administrative fine, arguing that the product had nevertheless been placed on the market.
The company appealed against the fine to the Chief Inspector of Trade Quality of Agricultural and Food Products (Główny Inspektor Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych – GIJHARS), acting as the second-instance authority. GIJHARS annulled the regional decision and referred the case back for re-examination, citing the lack of clear findings as to whether the product had in fact been placed on the market.
The company challenged that decision before the administrative courts. After losing before the Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny – WSA), the case was brought before the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA), which ultimately annulled both the judgment of the WSA and the decision of GIJHARS, holding that there were no grounds for continuing the sanctioning proceedings.
The Court confirmed that the concept of “placing on the market”, as defined in Article 3(8) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, has a broad and functional meaning, covering in particular:
The NSA did not question either the definition itself or the established approach to its interpretation, including that reflected in European Commission guidance documents. The problem in this case lay elsewhere.
The key message of the judgment is clear: it is not sufficient that a given factual situation could be classified as “placing on the market”; the authority must demonstrate that it actually occurred.
In the case at hand, there were no unequivocal findings that the product had moved beyond the stage of border control, that the importer had genuinely been able to dispose of it as part of commercial operations, or that there had been any real “holding for placing on the market”, as opposed to a mere intention or possibility.
The Court emphasised that the assumption “import equals placing on the market” is not acceptable in sanctioning proceedings.
Importantly, the judgment makes it clear that the dispute did not concern any ambiguity in the law, nor the need to refine the legal definition of placing on the market. Rather, it concerned the authority’s failure to prove one of the essential prerequisites for imposing a fine.
The NSA also addressed the conduct of the appellate authority. At the appeal stage, GIJHARS was not limited to referring the case back for re-examination. Having at its disposal all relevant information, it could have resolved the case on the merits and annulled the fine, concluding that—on the known facts—there were no grounds to establish that the product had been placed on the market.
Instead, GIJHARS opted to annul the decision and remit the case to the regional inspectorate, arguing that further factual findings were required. The NSA disagreed, holding that no additional evidentiary proceedings were necessary, as the issue concerned the legal assessment of known facts, not their absence. The referral was therefore deemed an unjustified prolongation of the proceedings, rather than a proper substantive resolution.
The judgment significantly strengthens procedural safeguards for businesses. Administrative fines cannot be imposed based on automatic reasoning or regulatory shortcuts. The authority must precisely identify the moment at which a product moves from the stage of control into actual market circulation, and the burden of proof lies with the inspection authority.
For importers, this means that the status of the product at the border is legally decisive, and that documenting the stage at which the product is located (border control, administrative procedure, market circulation) may constitute a genuine line of defence.
This approach is particularly relevant for imports from third countries, where a formal border control stage separates the physical entry of goods into the EU from their placement on the market. In intra-EU trade, such a “border moment” does not, as a rule, exist.
Dr Izabela Tańska, Food Law & Sustainable food Regulation Expert, CEO
“This judgment is important not because it changes the definition of ‘placing on the market’—it does not. That concept has long been broad, functional and well established in food law, both in legislation, case law and European Commission guidance.
The core issue lies elsewhere. This is not a definitional problem; it is an evidentiary one. The Supreme Administrative Court clearly reminded authorities that, even where food law concepts are broad, they cannot substitute for proof. The mere fact of import, a declared intention to sell, or a hypothetical possibility of placing a product on the market is not sufficient to demonstrate that placing on the market occurred in a specific case.
Importantly, the Court also addressed the appellate authority’s responsibility. Where all relevant facts are already known, the authority should resolve the case on the merits rather than remit it for reconsideration. This judgment shows that problems in sanctioning cases may arise not only from how inspections are conducted, but also from whether authorities are willing to take responsibility for a substantive decision at the appropriate stage.”
The ruling forms part of an increasingly clear line of case law in which Polish administrative courts are raising evidentiary standards in sanctioning proceedings and limiting the use of regulatory presumptions. It sends an important signal to inspection authorities and to the market alike.
This material is provided for information purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or a legal opinion in any specific case.
